Brian's
Research Page |
I tend to pursue a number of distinct, but related, projects at the same time. All of these describe long-term projects and I tend to shift each on and off the front burner as I get more or less bored with it.
This is the logical extension of
my dissertation work, in which I argued that cognitive science should be structured
more like computational neuroethology. What would such a beast look like? This
project intends answer that question. The target phenomenon is the apparent
capacity to infer information concerning the mental states of others using eye-gaze
cues. In other words, how we use the eyes as the windows to the soul, as Da
Vinci put it. To that end, I am looking at recent work in autism, primate comparative
eye-gaze perception work, human neuroimaging of eye gaze detection, and philosophical
work on theory of mind.
This project is funded by The James
S. McDonnell Project in Philosophy and the Neurosciences. A detailed project
description can be found on their site.
To get an idea of the project, take a look at the chapter I wrote for Colin Allen, Marc Bekoff
& Gordon Burghardt's forthcoming MIT Press volume, The
Cognitive Animal.
What is the current status of functionalist
explanation in psychology given the recent explosion of neuroscientific research?
In the 20th century, philosophy of psychology has witnessed an amazing line
of philosophical development from the logical behaviorism of Ryle and Wittgenstein
to mind-brain identity theory to contemporary functionalism in its many forms.
Many competing varieties of functionalism have been developed as well as equally
many lines of objections and problems for this approach. This line of development
seemed finally to play out in the late 80s/early 90s. It is now time to take
a step back and see where we have been and where we are likely to go.
There are two papers that most clearly falls into this project area:
1) "Shocking
Lessons from Electric Fish"
2) "Fixing content and function in neurobiological systems".
Eigenmannia virescens
is a species of weakly electric fish. They produce constant electrical signals
of very low voltage that play a role in perception and social communication.
This year, I will be setting up a lab at Pitzer to continue my graduate project
looking at how social context affects electric organ discharge frequency.
I am hoping to open a lab to do further work in this area. At the moment, my
only publication is an abstract:
1) "Large,
slow changes in electric organ discharge associated with social context in Eigenmannia"
If "practical ethics"
is the application of ethical theory to everyday situations, then there ought
to be "practical epistemology" that does the same thing for theory
of knowledge. It would show us how to think about "weird things" such
as miracles and conspiracy theories, as well as just everyday things, like what
cues tell us that something is alive.
Two papers that exhibit this line of research are :
1) "Of
Conspiracy Theories"
2) "Evaluating Artificial Life and
Artificial Organisms"
This research topic is pretty straightforward:
Interesting philosophical problems raised by the relatively recent science of
Artificial Life, which attempts to create life-like phenomena in artificial
media, such as computers and robots.
There are three papers online from this line of work:
1) "Against the Global Replacement"
2) "Evaluating ALife & Artificial
Organisms"
3) "Artificial Life for Philosophers"
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Last Modified: 24 March, 2006.
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