Anthropomorphism, Primatomorphism, Mammalomorphism: Understanding cross-species comparisons

Abstract

In this paper, it is argued that the charge that anthropomorphizing non-human animals is a fallacy is itself largely misguided and mythic. The charge of fallacious anthropomorphizing in the study of animal behavior is placed in its original, theological context. Having set the historical stage, I then present an analysis of anthropomorphism by discussing its relationship to a number of other, related issues: the role of anecdotal evidence, the taxonomy of related anthropomorphic claims, its relationship to the attribution of psychological states in general, and the nature of the charge of anthropomorphism as a categorical claim. I then argue that the categorical reading of anthropomorphism cannot work and that it misrepresents what is being claimed when traits are said to be shared between humans and non-humans. We should think of such claims not as anthropomorphic per se—because that implies the trait is intrinsically human and only derivatively non-human. Instead, traits shared with mammals are mammalomorphic, for example, or primatomorphic when shared by primates.